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Introduction 
9 
One of the most important problem up to which our Japanese Marriage Law has 
been continuely faced both in the past and at present is Naien or Naien-relation. Naien 
is the relation between man and woman which is not legally admitted to be the lawful 
marriage on account of the failure of the registration which is laid down by the Family 
Registry Act.1) The Naien problems have continued to exist ever since the middle 
of Meiji era when the Civil Code was enacted (1898， 31st year of Meiji). They， accord-
ing to the author's opinion， can be grouped into three major issues as follows. Firstly， 
why such Naien arises? Secondly， how far the effects of lawful marriage should be 
given to Naien? Lastly， what legal measure should be taken in future for solution of 
Naien problems? Thus， the purpose of the author in this treatise is to consider， prin-
cipal1y， three major points as indicated above.2) 
1 Why Naien arises? 
1) Old provision of the Civil Code (s 775-until 1947) provided: 
‘The lawful marriage comes into effect in consequence of the registration 
requested by the provision in the Family Registry Act.' 
教 Lecturerof Civil Law， Osaka University. 
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This provision is sti1l reserved in the current code in spite of the post-war Revi-
sion of the Civil Code in 1947 (22nd year of Showa). Major theories take the view 
that the word ‘come into effect' means 'come into existence'. And， they also com-
prehend that the registration has to be received by the 0伍cial. ln short， the lawful 
marriage comes into existence， inour marriage law， by the registration to and the recep-
tion of it by the Family Registry 0伍ce. Such a system is cal1ed the Principle of Regi-
stered-marriage. Old provision above mentioned adopted the different principle from 
the one which used to be found in our custom til that time or in the previous provi岨
sion， and this introduction of the new simple-form principle， the Principle of Registered-
marriage， was based on the idea of the drafters as follows: 
‘As the society has been regulated and progressed， the nation has been 
understanding the registration. And the registration is more familiar for the 
nation than the provision hitherto requesting complecated procedure or cere-
mony.' 
Thus， the Principle of Registered-marriage was adopted， but the real circumstances 
hereafter in society were not in accord with the expectation. After then， in1925， the 
conc1usion of the Committee of the House of Commons intending to reform the prin鋼
ciple was published， but was not made into action. 
By the way， our custom was in the past and also at present as fol1ows. Generally 
speaking， the spouses go through the process of the celebration of the marriage五rst，then 
the conhabitation. And most spouses make the registration after their cohabitation. 
Customary conception， however， isthat man and woman become the formal couple 
by celebrating their marriage. Here lies the gap between our custom or general con-
sciousness and the provision in the Act. Strict1y speaking from the point of the law， 
the spouses， before the registration after the cohabitation， are in Naien-re1ation. Al-
though most couples register their marriage soon or later， some couples neglect to 
register due to various reasons. This is Naien in the narrow or strict sence， which the 
author treats in this treatise as the very important problem. The parties to Naien 
are disadvantaged in the code in comparison to the parties to the lawful marriage. 
However treats the provision of the code to this dis丘dvantaged，it cannot be denied that 
such a union as Naien arises in the actual society. Well， why Naien a 
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try of man's ‘House'. ‘House' is the feudal fami1y corporation， isthe organization 
consisting of 'the head of House' and his family， and is expressed in the family registry 
as one body. The family constituents have the same surname as the head， are com-
manded by ‘the head of House'. 'House' is succeeded with its identity by 'the succes-
sion to House'. Accordingly， inthe past time the marriage meant that a woman left 
her ‘House' to which she former1y belonged and newly was added to man's ‘House'. 
(a few reverse cases existed.) Under such a system， there are grounds which permits 
Naien; one is in the code itse1f， another in the consciousness of the people. The 
former is the provision of the code. That is to say， man and woman cannot get marri-
ed legally in such cases as follows: when both are ‘the apparent heir-at-law to House'; 
when both or each cannot get the consent of ‘the head of House'， orwhen both or each 
cannot get the consent of their parents in case of man is under thirty years of age or 
woman under twenty-five; when man and woman are coadulterers. 
The latter is the consciousness of the people， which is also related to the basis 
of the provision of the code above mentioned. As previously mentioned， the parties 
cannot register their marriage unless they can get either the consent of ‘the head of 
House' or their parents. The consent is made from the view point of the preserva-
tion of the feudal family system， and the Civil Code stipulated such provisions for 
such purpose. Accordingly，‘the head of House' or parents refuse his family or issue 
to choose as the spouse man or woman whom he (‘the head of House') does not like 
or regard suitable to his family. His purpose of attempt is to preserve and strengthen 
the feudal family system， orto strengthen the joint of 官 ouses'each other. Further-
more， the marriage has been meant to aquire the successor for the preservation of 官 ou-
se' as the important purpose. Therefore， there was the tendency， among the people， 
not to let add a woman to the family registry as the lawful wife until she conceived 
or gave birth to her child. Again， on account of the absence of the legal consciousness， 
there were the people who regarded the registration troublesome. But the state did 
not inflict any punishment against the non-performers and did not make any posト
tive endevour to promote the observation of registration. 
Points above mentioned are the grounds which allowed to arise Naien before the 
もNar. In shor 
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rement as to the registration of the marriage which used to exist were removed. And， 
the present principle is that 'marriage shall be based on the mutual consents of both 
sexes' (the Constitution S24). The Principle of Registered-marriage， however， remains 
inspite of the Revision of the code， and the parties also at present have to register by 
the request of the Family Registry Act in order to be admitted as the parties to lawful 
marnage. 
There was not a few critics agaist the Principle of Registered-marriage. And， 
on the discussion of this Revision in 1947， the assertion insisting to change it wasmade. 
But the government admitted the conclusion of Judicial Committee in the House of 
Commons as fol1ows: 
'There is a marriage which does not go through the ceremony， and it is 
di伍cultto decide the fact of cohabitation. Again， itis not distinct for the 
strangers to know when the parties got married. At present the registration 
becomes a1ready customary， and is gradually being pervaded， therefore we have 
no great inconvenience. And， not on1y the con五rmation“procedureof the Fami1y 
Court incurs the increase of expence of the Court but it may run counter to the 
direction of marriage句1iberalization. In short， the prob1em regarding the 
marriage-registration shou1d be studied prudently， and be argued at the time 
of whole revision of the Civi1 Code.' 
Nevertheless， there are not a few Naierトre1ationstil at present. Why Naien arises 
at present? This is the next question. 
Well， Naien being out of law， the inquiry as to it is forced to carry by questiorト
ing the Naien coup1es personally and getting their response. Such inquiries have been 
done by some scho1ars after the War and reports have been pub1ished. We can 1earn 
the actua1 circumstances as to Naien by them. Genera1 conclusions obtained are as 
follows. 
As the feuda11egal requirements of the past are not existing， there is no Naien-
relation in such respect. According1y， the parties who cou1d not get married before 
the Revision of the code by reason of such bars， can register at present. Neverthe1ess， 
the reports of the inquiry inform us the fact be1ow. That is， there are many who are 
stil1 bound with the consciousness of ‘House' or the non-consents of parents (or 'the 
head of House' before) as in the past. The case of them being bound with the con-
sciousness of ‘House' is that the man or the woman had once been 'the head of House' 
or‘the apparent heir-at開1awto House' 
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cessary to say that there is no 'House' existing at present， and the marriage is an act 
in which two persons make a new social unit. Nevertheless， there sti1 exists such a 
consciousness， and it is founded on the fact that they shun to pub1icize such a union 
on the family registry -some people regard it as the symbol of‘託ouse'. The same 
applies in the respect of the consent of parents. Though there is no legal impediment 
to a marriage of adults -minors need the consent of their parents -， it seems that 
there are many who are stil1 affected by the feudal family ideas contained in the old 
code. The restriction by the code disappears， but the social restriction is at work. 
Next， there is another ground of continuing Naierトrelation，until the pregnancy 
or the childbirth. It is reported that in eighty-five cases out of one hundred actual 
Naien-relations， they have no children of their own. It must be admitted that the 
pregrancy or childbirth is the most encouraging factor in prompting the registration. 
lt is true that one of the most important purpose of marriage is to get their own child. 
But， the registration stabilizes the legal positions of both parties， therefore those who 
fail to register c乱nnotbe free from the blame as being lazy persons. 
The more important， however， iswhether such old ideas -people regard the 
marriage as the way of getting their successors or the way of continuing ‘House' as 
seen in many past cases， that is to say， the ancient idea of‘the wife being unable to 
bear a child must leave' -lurks or not. ln this respect， we must be watchful to the 
short-time Naien剛relation.
Next， there sti1 are cases of neglecting the registration. The procedure of mar-
riage回registrationin our law is very simple: writing down the particulars requested on 
the forms laid down; signing and sealing on the paper; presenting the document to 
the Family Registry 0伍ce;complete the whole procedure. Mailing the paper to the 
Family Registry 0伍ceis also acknowledged. .A:hd， when the paper is proper1y receiv-
ed by the ofticial， their marriage becomes complete legal1y. (In other word， the cere-
mony or the cohabitation is not necessitated in establishing the lawful marriage.) Rather 
troublesome is to get the sign and seal of two adult witnesses， but friend or acquaintance 
is good enough for this purpose， therefore it is not very troublesome requirement. 
Judging from the above， we can possibly believe as follows; the non-performanc 
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birth and then transits into the lawful marriage. The inquiries above being the base 
for the report， were asked to the parties to N aien about the real reason of their being 
in Naien-relation. Similarly， facts of the pregnancy or the childbirth being the mo-
ment for transition from Naien to the lawful marriage， are con五rmedby the inquiry 
at the registration五led. As mentioned before， the procedure to register in J apan is 
simple， but no legal compulsion is imposed on man to register his marriage. Some 
scholars have done the inquiries as to how soon the registration was being made after 
the celebration or from the beginning of their cohabitation. What we learn by them 
is the following table.3) 
Period. from the ceremony or cohabitation to the registration of the marriage. 
ふ¥ R a t i 0Within 1 month Over 1 month Over 6 months (30 days) within 6 months within 1 year 
1927 ( 2) 6.3 22.8 30.9 
1940 (15) 11.6 18.9 46.7 
1947 (22) 17.4 35.3 23.8 
1949A (24) 18.7 27.6 25.0 
1949B (24) 9.7 20.7 32.5 
1952 (27) 13.2 46.1 17.7 
1955 (30) 16.5 48.5 14.8 
1958 (33) 17.4 53.5 13.8 
1960 (35) 23.8 38.1 19.8 
As pointed out by the table， not a few cases of registrations have been made long 
after the ceremony. And， judging from the五guresof registration being made be-
tween six months to one year， inmost cases the pregnancy or childbirth must be the 
moment for the registration. Again， itseems to the author there must be cases of the 
parties spending some months for the purpose of judging whether they can live toge-
ther well and expect to keep an amicable cohabitation in future. 1n short， most mar-
riages become to be lawful through such Naien-relation long or short. Here is one 
of the important problems of Naien“relation. The author is alarmed that whether the 
people are c1εarly conscious of the instability of their status due to the norトregistration，
and whether the consciousness of ‘House' is abusing Naien-relation， and whether people 
are captured by the notion of the marriage for the purpose of getting the issues， orby 
the idea of 'woman without child must leave'. 
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II How far the effects of lawful marriage should be given to Naien? 
1) 1t is an important problem whether to keep Naien outside of the legal protec岬
tion. 1n property law， itwi1l be good that one who does not observe the rules or fails 
to do the proceeding with some grounds is not given protection at al. 1n family law， 
however， there is a particular phenomena of ‘the advance of the fact'. That is to say， 
whatever restriction being imposed by the code， a union of man and woman arises as 
a fact， and a child is to be born， and persons must die. We cannot deny the fact that 
a union of man and woman which is a substantial married life exists as a matter of 
fact notwithstanding the provisions of 'the code. Thus， Naien is the problem of the 
fact preceding the law. Even if law neglects Naierトrelation，we cannot check it to 
exist， Naien couples to transact with the strangers， orthem to get a child. It is not 
reasonable to neglect such a fact. At least law has to give protection to them in some 
respects. Bringing Naien as close to the lawful marriage in respect of the effect as 
possible， will give protection to not only the parties but also the strangers concerned. 
2) The doctrine concerning Naien has been developped in two五巴lds，name1y 
in the case-law and in the special Act， not the Civil Code. And， it has been deve10p同
ped in the direction of giving the protection to Naien couples generally， with a few 
exceptlOns. 
The author takes the liberty to review五rstthe case-law. 
1n regard to the effect of Naien， the problem arising firstly and being of most 
important， isthe one as to the damages rendered wh巴nNaien is breached wrongly. 
Until 1915 (4th year of Taisho) the judgements and the theories stood on the foot of 
the principle of ‘no marriage， without registration'. And， they took the attitude to 
regard Naien being only a precontract leading to the lawful marriage in future and 
the parties thereto being not bound to perform such a precontract. Thus， no 
protection was given to Naien. 1n 1915， however， the Supreme Court (Taishin-in 
at that time) held that the parties to Naien was to be given protection. A man and 
a woman held the marriage ceremony and lived together for a few days. Then she 
came back to her native home， and when the man was hospitalized to care the desease， 
she never called on him. And she called at his house only once， and never called on 
their marriage-broker contrary to the custom of their place. 80 the man noticed her 
to dissolve their Naien-re1ation. 8he claimed against him for the damages on the 
ground of a tort. T 
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Court where she had prevailed over him. The judgement of the Supreme Court was 
that she should bring her action on the ground of a non-performance of obligation not 
a tort. By the way， the importance of this judgement is in obiter dicta that: 
‘a precontract to the marriage is a contract with the purpos巴ofentering 
into the lawful marriage in future; it is 1awfu1 and va1id; though it is impossib1e 
1egal1y to compe1 the parties to marry according to the import of the contract， 
when one party thereto breaches it and refuses tO marry， he is ob1iged to in-
demnify the corporea1 and incorporea1 10ss rendered tO the other thereto suf.町
fering from be1ieving the contract.' 
Thus， for the first time an unreasonab1e breach to N aien was understood as a non-
performance of a precontract to the marriage， and the damaged can recover the damages 
from the non-performer. Substantially， however， Naien is marriage itself and not 
a precontract to the marriage. Surely the judgement of the Supreme Court above 
was significant from the point hat it founded the way to re1ieve Naien coup1es. But， 
though the precontract theory may be reasonab1e as to the relation between the par欄
ties to Naien， itcannot rule correct1y the re1ation between the strangers and the par-
ties， for the precontract binds on1y the parties. Therefore， ifthe s01ution is aimed 
according to the nature of fact， Naien shou1d be deemed as the same re1ation as the 
1awfu1 marriage， iふ， the quasi“marriage， and the unreasonab1e breach should be under幽
stood as a tort， that is， to1et lose the post of wife in fact. Many theories asserted that 
the quasi開marriagetheory was good and they critisized the judgement. Though， 
after then， judgements remained on th巴footof 'the nonωperformance of precontract 
to the marriage' thoery， but were aftected by the theories， and some judgements showed 
the conclusion which cou1d not be reached un1ess they stood on the foot of the quasi-
marriage theory. There were， for instance， judgements as follows. 
When a marchant who had supp1ied the necessities to N aien couples claimed for 
the lien of the wh01e sum of the necessities -if a Naien wife is not comprehended 
to be one of ‘re1atives 1iving together to be supported by the debtor' in the provision 
(~31 0)， the marchant can claim on1y ha1f of the sum -， the Supreme Court admitted 
the plaintift's claim on the ground of the Naien wife being regarded as one of the 're1a-
tives living together' (Jun.， 
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And it wiI1 be said that judgements were onthe direetion to deem Naien as the quasi-
marriage. By the way， the Supreme Court (called Saiko・Saibansho)recently held as 
following (Apr.， 11. 1958， 33rd year of Showa). 
‘So-called Naien is not di:ferent from the marriage-relation from the point 
of it being a union in which a man and a woman cooperate each other in mak-
ing their life as husband and wife， therefore it is not prevented to consider N aien 
as the relation same as the marriage.' ヨtshould be regarded that one who 
was breached of Naien-relation unreasonably can claim for the indemnity for 
the loss against the other thereto on the ground of a non-performance of a 
precontract to the marriage， atthe same time he can claim on the ground of a 
tort.' 
Thus， inthe case-law Naien is admitted as the quasi岨marriagenowadays. 
3) Secondly， Naien has appeared in some special legislations. The first Act 
which tried to identify Naien with the lawful marriage and to give protection to the 
parties thereto， was the Factory Act in 1923 (12th year of Taisho). The Act provided 
that;‘a person who are supported of his livelihood by the income of a workman or 
a miner， on the death of the workman or miner，' was added to the person who could 
claim for the allowance for the surviving dependents. The Naien spouses were also 
included in this provision， and they were given protection legally in enacted law for 
the first time. But， the expression in this Act was euphemistical and the protection 
by it was comparatively weak due to the fact that putting them in the later turn of the 
protected persons. After then， the Protection to Mother and Child Act in 1937 (12th 
yeq.r of Showa) provided clearly that: 
'The person who shall be given the compensation for the surviving depen-
dents， isthe spouse of the labourer (including the person who is in fact in 
the same relation as the legally. married spouse even if the registration of the 
marriage was never made).' 
Social Acts which contain such expressions have increased since then. It should 
be noted that the protection to Naien couples by the enacted law appears in such special 
acts. One of the grounds for it， was that there were many Naien couples among the 
comparatively low-c1ass people or the labour-c1as. 
4) As the author showed， itis the sett1ed opinion to regard Naien as the quasi-
marriage nowadays. Now it becomes the important question how far the e:fects of 
lawful marriage should be given to Naien. 
Naien is a phenom 
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difference between Naien and the lawful marriage depends on the exIstence of the 
registration. Accodingly， the effects which are based on the registration， i.e.， the 
common use of the surname， the legitimacy of the issues， and the origination of the 
a伍nity，cannot be admitted in Naien. The right of succession also is not to be admit崎
ted. But， the effects of lawful marriage substantial to the actual cohabitation must 
be admitted also in Naien-relation. The obligation to cohabit， tocooperate and to 
support， and the obligation of chastity， are admitted. About the above， there were 
judgements of the Supreme Court. A (woman) and B (man) entered into Naien-
relation and lived together， then after they dissolved it by their mutual consent. Then， 
A brought an action against B claiming for the restitution of unjust enrichment on 
the ground that B got an advantages unjustly because of that A kept their house-work. 
The High Court held that: the cohabitation of husband and wife in married life is 
for the common benefit of the couple not for the benefit of husband only; it applies 
same in Naien; it should not be regarded that A was the loser while B was the gainner， 
for A kept the house-work for their common benefit. The Supreme Court also held 
the judgement of the High Court good. (May， 17. 1921， 10th year of Taisho) 
Next， the relation between the parties mentioned above has to be protected against 
the strangers. There was the judgement of the Supreme Court (May， 12. 1919， 8th 
year of Taisl吋. A (man) and B (woman) were in Naien-relatio払 Bbegot 1悶 child
after becoming intimate with C (another maヰ SoA claimed for the damages against 
C on the grounds that A was defamed and suffered from mental pain. The Supreme 
Court held that the claim of A was good. 
Furthermore， asregard to the relation about the property between the parties 
to N aien， the fol1owing provisions must be admitted， which fit for the actual circums-
tances of Naien-relation， cohabitation like in the married life. Provisions ar日 tl)e
mutual share of the expences in the married life (P60 -husband and wife shal1 share 
the expences arising from the married life in consideration with their means， income 
and al1 other circumstances); the joint liability to the obligation arising from the dai1y 
domestic affairs (P61 -when either husband or wife performs a transaction in the 
daily domestic affairs with a stranger， the other party shal1 jointly be liable to the obli-
gation arising fro 
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recuperation they dissolved Naien-relation by their mutual consent. A asserted that 
B should share the expences for the medical treatment which A paid during her iI1-
ness as‘the expences arising from the married life (P60)'. The 8upreme Court held 
that B had to share the expences according to the purport of the section 760 (Apr.， 11.
1958， supra). 
5) The interesting problem is whether the provision regarding 'the distribution 
of property' (~768) can be applicable to Naien・ Thesection 768 states: 
( 1) Either of those who have divorced by their mutual consent (same 
in the divorce by the judicial proceeding - ~771) can claim for the distribution 
of property against the other thereto. 
( 2) When it is not able to be concluded or impossible to reach the agree-
ment of the distribution of property according to the previous subsection， the 
party can claim against the Family Court for the disposal in substitution for 
the agreement， povided that within two years. 
( 3) ln the case of the previous subsection， the Family Court shall decide 
whether or not let him (or her) distribute， the sum and ways of the distribution， 
in consideration with the sum which the parties have acquired by their coopera-
tion， and with al other circumstances.' 
That is to say， 'the distribution of property' is the delivery of property between the 
parties on their divorce， and this provision is an epoch-making one which was newly 
enacted in the Revision of the code in 1947. By the way， most theories have asserted 
that 'the distribution of property' must be applied to Naien-relation. Again， we can 
see some determinations in the Family Court affirming such. This problem had not 
been clear in the case-law since there had been no judgement about it in the 8upreme 
Court and the High Court until June of 1963， when the Hiroshima High Court held 
in the decision that 'the distribution ofproperty' was to be admitted also in Naien. 
This decision bears the important significance. 80， the author wil1 review this case 
and the system of' 'the distribution of property' in detail. 
The summary of the facts in this case as follows. A (woman) and B (man) held 
the marriage ceremony and cohabited as the Naien couples without the registr丘tionof 
the marriage. A was a hard worker compared with B， and earnest1y attended to their 
work or business， the handicraft job. They endevoured jointly to accurn1ate wealth. 
One year later they bought land with Y400，000， and th，e next year built their h 
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wanted to let her return to her native family. B followed C's opinion. Thus， their 
Naien-relation was dissolved after the cohabitation of two years， without a distinct 
fau1t on the part of A. The tota1 sum of the property including the chatte1es， etc.， 
which they had earned， was about Yl，300，000. A claimed for distributing of their 
common property that they had earned together and for recovering the physica1 and 
mental 10ss due to the unreasonable disso1ution. . The High Court he1d that: 
‘If Naien-relation means substantially the same married-1ife relation of 
husband and wife as in the 1awful marriage， and is merely defect of the regi-
stration， itis not a1ways unreasonable to treat Naierトre1ationlegally same as 
the marriage， not so far as confl.icting the purport of the Civil Code whichpro-
vides the registration 1aid down in the Family Registry Act as the legal require回
ment of the formation of the marriage.' ‘Although‘the distribution of property' 
is done on the dissolution of the marriage， itcan be said thatζthe distribution 
of property' regu1ates finally the married-1ife re1ation of husband and wife that 
had been existing， and it does not affect direct1y to the rights of the strangers. 
Therefore it is reasonable to admit ‘the distribution of property' in Naienィela輔
tion.' 
And the Court held that A was to be paid ￥450，000 from B as the sett1ement of ac-
counts resulting from her work during their cohぬitationand as the damages， that is， 
as ‘the distribution of property.' 
It seems to the author that this case signifies two remarkable points to us. First， 
this is one of the typica1 example as to the application of ‘the distribution of property'. 
That is to say， A worked hardin order to be wealthy， different from ordinary wives 
who confined themselves only to the housekeeping， which became one important 
factor in the award of ‘the distribution of property'. Secondly， the fact that they re輔
mained in Naien-relation and did not register， may be derived from the old idea of 
the feudal family system. The author dwells on those in detail. 
Well，‘the distribution of property' is one of the most important effects of the 
divorce， and it has the important significance p1ays the important ro1e from the point 
that it gives the strong protection to the spouses (especially wife) who used to be weak 
financially in most cases before the War. ‘The distribution of property' is， in his 
opinion， the delivery system laid down for the purpose 
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however， no settled theory and judgement in regard to the nature of ‘the distribution 
of property'. Especial1y， there are various opinions whether the damages is implied 
or not. This is owing to the fact that some room is left in the Civil Code to claim 
for damages apart from ‘the distribution of property'. The 8upreme Court held， 
as the author believes， that the damages can be included to 'the distribution of pro-
perty' (Feb.， 21. 1956， 31th year of 8howa). But this judgement is not always clear， 
and some points remain dubious in regard to the application of this provision. In 
this respect， the author believes as follows: he cannot五ndthe positive ground exclud-
ing the damages from ‘the distribution of property' according to the construe of the 
section 768. It decreases the e伍cacyof‘the distribution of property' and opposes 
the benefits of the parties to exclude only the damages and to let him (or her) claim 
for it by another action. Moreover we have many mediation cases in the Family 
Court (most judicial divorce c丘sesat present are dealt with this proceeding) which 
solved al the monetary affairs including the damages. 80， the author thinks that it 
is reasonable that the damages is to be included in ‘the distribution of property' as 
a part of it. As to the doubtful points above， the legislative solution wi1 have to be 
done for the purpose of distinguishing that 'the distribution of property' is the com-
plete solution in regard to the property between husband and wife. 
As mentioned above in detail， the theories and judgements are not in accord as 
to the nature of ‘the distribution of property'. But the theories agree that ‘the distri-
bution of property' is the final regulation for the married life of husband and wife. 
And they have asserted that ‘the distribution of property' has to be applied on the 
dissolution of N aien-relation like in the marriage. The decision of Hiroshima High 
Court took the same opinion， and by this -regrettable that this is not the one in the 
8upreme Court -it seems that‘the distribution of property' was a伍rmedin N aien. 
Next， there is the problem as to the relation between 'the distribution of property' 
and the succession. At present， one of the differences between the effects of Naien 
and of lawful marriage is in the right of succession. The author has an opinion in 
regard to the relation between ‘the distribution of property' and the succession as 
fol1ows. 
The reason of the parties to Naien being no 
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something to mention as follows. 
In the partial revision of the Civil Code in 1962， the provision of ‘the distribution 
of the inheritance4) to the specially concerned' (958-3) was added. That is， incase 
of no heir-at-law， the Family Court may confer in the discretion， on the application 
being made by the specially concerned， the whole or the part of the inheritance to them 
who ‘were in the same livelihood of the dead'. Of course， the parties to Naien are 
included above， and they can receive in fact the property of the dead. This is the 
supplementary disposal when there is no heir聞at-law，and the provision does not pur聞
port to confer the right of the succession to Naien couples. But it is clear that by 
this provision they will greatly be relieved. The purport of this provision has to be 
noted. Moreover， ithas to be noted that many sociallegislations grant the compensa-
tion to the surviving dependents of the Naien spouses. Therefore the author thinks 
it desirable to consider that， on the dissolution of Naien by the death of either party， 
'the distribution of property' is also to be granted. While they can receive 'the 
distribution of property' on the dissolution， can receive nothing -unless special 
favour by s. 958-3 -on the death of the opposite. It wi1l10se a balance. And， the 
ground that the author does not confer the right of succession to them is as following. 
In succession many people are related to and in which their interests confront sharply. 
Therefore， it is most reasonable that only person whose existence is distinct1y showed 
on the 0伍cialrecord is to become the heir-aトlaw. Again， insuccession， the property 
which the dead succeeded previously from others， isalso to be included， that is the 
property which was gained without his or his spouse's labour or effort.5) Reversely， 
ln‘the distribution of property'， the object of the distribution is principally the 
property which is produced by them and the value of labour during their married 
life. Accordingly， itmust be understood that there is a substantial difference 
between ‘the distrbution of property' and the succession. In ‘the distribution of 
property' there is no accidentality such as seen in the succession， and the purpose 
of ‘the distribution of property' is to regulate only the parties concerned. Judging 
from the above， so far as we intend to appreciate the effort of the parties strictly， 
it is better and reasonable， also on the dissolution 0 
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disadvantages to the strangers. It returns one of the Naien couples for his (her)巴ffort
hitherto and gives him (her) a stable life in future. Again， there may arise a case that 
the heir-at-law takes unreasonable benefit on the sacrifice of the effort hitherto of the 
party to N aien， unless such a regulation is considered to rule. Thus， the author thinks 
that‘the distribution of property' should be performed on the dissolution of Naien 
by the death of the party also - accordingly， in this case， principally the labour 
hitherto of the couples is to be considered. It will not be unreasonable to extent the 
protection to the Naien couples upto this. 
6) Another question shown in the decision of the Hiroshima High Court is as 
follows. Though the author can not learn al the circumstances of this case correctly 
and in detail， judging from the record published， the situation is: the dissolution of 
Naien arose from the quarrel between A (Naien wife) and C (mother of Naien husband) 
which was brought by the disaccord of their characters. Moreover， the active persons 
who worked for the dissolution of Naien were C and her relatives， and B (husband) 
only consented their conclusion， taking no initiative in regard to the dissolution of his 
own Naien-relation. Again， A was forced to leave home on the ground that she was 
'out of harmony with the family tradition' according to the statement of C to the judge. 
This， inold days， often used to be the ground for divorce by the mutual consent， and 
also it was a convenient pretext for the husband or his relativ:es. And， itmust be 
noted that there was no child between them， which could also a good reason or a pre-
text for the divorce in old days. Thus， the author glimpses in this case a deep feudal 
conception. For their Naien was the relation not between the husband and wife but 
‘House' and wife. Again， itmust be noted， aswe can guess， that such circumstances 
kept her remain as Naien wife. That is， their cohabitation period lasted to see if she 
was fitted for the family tradition of‘House' or not， and when she was disqualified in 
the ‘test'， she had to leave ‘House' without becoming a lawful wife， or without the 
registration of the marriage. It seems to the author that it was the idea of the feudal 
‘House' of mother and her relatives which managed and pressed the idea and manner 
of B. 1n this respect， the author be1ieves， this is one of cases which include present-
day important problems about Naien. 
7) Next1 
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theory must be effective to any case of various situations. Many theories have been 
tried for the solution of this problem. And， asit is a very complecated problem， here 
the author will set up a typical example， and introduce the judgements and theories 
about it in turn. 
Case: Naien husband lyased a house from a stranger who was the owner of 
the house， and lived in it with his Naien wife. The husband was died. Can the 
widow continue to lease the house? 
a) Firstly， the judgements are as follows. They al affirm the succession of the 
lease and they construe that: the lease of Naien husband thereafter belongs to (1) his 
heir-atゐwif any (2)‘the corporation for inheritance' if there is no heir-at-law. -And 
a Naien widow can assert the lease against the lessor by the invocation of the right 
which belongs to the heir-at-law of the dead. The Supreme Court takes also this 
stand (in case of (2) above). 
The way of those thinking， the author believes， wil1 be right， for it is consistent 
with the provisions of the code. But it has weak points， for the invocation of the right 
belonging to the others is legally unstable， and it is unsettled as to how to solve it 
when the heir refuses the invocation. Moreover， 'the corporation for inheritance' 
exists only the period during which the existence of heir is not distinct， and when 
the non-existence of heir comes clear al1 the property principally belongs to the state-
fund. And， exceptionally，‘the distribution of inheritance to the speoially concerned' 
as above mentioned may be done. But， inthis exeptional case， whether the lease be-
longs to N aien widow through this process or not is the question which has to be set-
t1ed in future. For， for this purpose， the succession of the lease must be admitted as 
a premise， but some theories deny the lease to be included in the inheritance. In 
short， this way of thinking faces to many difficulties. In most cases there are many 
heirs-at-law， therefore the widow must assert both， against the heirs and the lessor. 
This imposes her some di伍culties. Accordingly， itwill be better to confer her the 
right direct1y. 
b) Various theories have been tried to solve this question. They can be 
classi五edinto some groups. 
i) Some theories deny the succession of the lease， and they construe that the 
lease of house can not be succeeded due to its particularity， but is to be transfered to 
the Familiengemeinscaft. 
According to this theory， on the death of Naien husband， a widow can con 
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from the following' points: why the lease of ‘house for residing' is excluded from 
the succession， orwhy it is not a right of property? 1t is not right to admit the right 
to belong to the Familiengemeinschaft， for the FamiHengemeinschaft is not a legal person 
and it is inconsistent with the idea of modern civillaw which admits the right to belong 
to the individuals. 
i) Some theories construe that: the lease of house can be an object of the succes-
sion; the heir succeeds it as a principle; but， though a Naien widow is not the heir-
at-law， such a person who is not the heir-at-law can assert the right of residing (Wohn-
recht) against the lessor so far as she ，vas implied in the lease-contract between the 
lessee (the dead man) and the lessor; and， ifthe heir requests to vacate the house against 
the Naien widow without reasonable ground， it is the abuse of right; therefore the 
widow is given protection to some extent against the heir. 
But this theory too requests the widow to claim for her residing in two relations. 
Furthermore， this theory construe that: if there are no heirs， the FamiHengemeinshaft 
which was behind the scene， appears to the front; and the person who lived with the 
dead man and is now the center of the family activity thereafter (e.g. Naien widow) 
resumes the lease. Therefore in any way the N aien widow can continue to reside 
there. But， though supplementary， this theory also， has the defect of admitting the 
doctrine of the FamiHengemeinschaft. 
ii) 1t is the right of residing (Wohnrecht) theory which appears in order to over-
come the defect in i and i above. 1ts gist is as follows. The succession of the lease 
of house can be devided into two， the succession of the lease of building and the right 
of residing (Wohnrecht).The former is a right on the property law， and can be suc圃
ceeded to heir時計幽lawtogether with other property of the dead according to the general 
rule of the succession. The latter is one of the right-for-existence and is a right on 
the sociallegislation which is on the different plane from the civillaw. And not only 
the lessee of the house but his lodger6) has the proper right of residing. 1n order， 
however， such a right of residing isto be .given， only the necessity of residing at the 
house is not su伍cient，but the lawfulness of residing is required. What is necessary 
for lawful residence is normally the presence of the lease-relation between the owner 
of the house and the lessee. And on the death of the lessee， ifthere 
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proper right of residing， toboth the lessor and the heir国at-lawof her dead Naien hus-
band. 80 far as her 'residence being admitted to be worthy of protection (iふ thepre四
sence of the necessity)， the constructive lease-relation between the lessor and her can 
be admitted by the application of the provision of the Act.ηThis paves the way to 
the lawfulness of her right of residing. In this way she is given the right to continue 
to reside in the same house. 
This theory overcomes the defect of the Familiengemeinshaft theory which is in-
compatible to the individual-doctrine of modern civil law， by means of establishing 
the conception of the right of residing proper to each individuals. This intends to 
give protection to a Naien widow who has no right of succession， without being in句
consistent with the law of succession， by means of admitting the right on the social 
legislation. Though it is a hard task where we find the basis for the constructive lease-
relation， atthe present time when we have no distinct provision， this theory will be 
considered to be very appropriate for the solution of the problem. 
8) The best way for this purpose， however， isto enact the statute， and the ef-
forts have been tried in the direction of its realization. In December of 1959 (34th 
year of 8howa)‘Project of the fundamental principles for the revision of the Lease of 
Land and House Act' was published. It has the paragraph as follows. 
明o42 -The succession of the lease on the death of lessee. 
( 1) In case of the death of lessee of the building for residing， on the 
death of the lessee， ifa spouse of the lessee or relatives within two degrees of 
the same (including a person who is in the same relation due to Naien-relation 
with the lessee) live together in the building， the lodgers (when the building 
is used for the purpose of other than residence， the lodgers and the heir-at-law 
of the lessee) take jointly the right and obligation as to the locarium and the 
foregift before the death. 
( 2) When there are no lodgers (or the heir-at-law of the lessee) of the 
previous section， the lease comes to extinguish on the death of the lessee， and 
the right and obligation as to the locarium and foregift before the death of the 
lessee， belongs to the inheritance.' 
The remarkable points in this 'Project' are:五rstlythat in respect of the lease of the 
building for residing， the building is excluded from the object of the succession， and 
is taken over by the lodgers; and in respect of the l
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Secondly that the 'Project' has speci五edc1ear1y who can be inc1uded to the lodgers. 
It states distinctly that the N aien spouse or relatives are to be inc1uded in ‘lodger' 
and to be given protection. Thirdly that the 'Project' does not adopt the Famili・enge-
meinshaft theory. 
Thus， ifthis 'Project' is codified， the continued residence of Naien widow wi1 
no doubt be given protection. 
III What legal measure should be taken in future 
for solution of Naien problems? 
Final1y， the叩 thorwi1 mention as to the problems which are to be solved in 
future. It is more important to diminish the number of Naien-relations in any way 
in future than to give protection to the present Naien couples. Naien-relation is the 
product of the Principle of Registered幽marriage，therefore it may be possible to 
extinguish Naien by the revision of the Principle of Registered-marriage. But it is 
not right， for in case we adopt other principles， we五ndsome defects. The author 
wi1 examine those principles in turn. 
a) The Principle of De fact四marriage. This is th号 principlerecognizing the 
substantial married life as the lawful marriage. According to this principle Naien-
relation disappears absolutely， for Naien is a substantial married life and thus it is 
recognized as the lawful marriage. Therefore in this respect， this is a c1earcut solu-
tion. But， the legal system as to the marriage does not mere1y aim at to extinguish 
Naien. The important purposes in the modern marriage law are to maintain the 
order of monogamy system， topromote the formation of the lawful marriage which is 
in accordance with the substantial legal requirement， and to adopt the system which 
can distinguish the parties and the date of the formation of marriage. Judging from 
the above， the Principle of De fact-marriage has some vital defects. First， itis not 
adequate for maintaining the monogamy， for the distinction between the lawful mar-
riage and Naien may become obscure and there may be some room of the bigamy to 
arise. Second， the cases may arise in which the formation of marriage and its date 
are not distinguishable. Third， itcannot prevent the occurrence of the marriage 
between prohibited degrees or the marriage of infant which are in breach of the sub-
stantial legal requirement. Furthermore， ifwe admit the De fact-marriage as the 
lawful marriage， who js to acknowledge the formation of mariage， and when， how and 
in what way? Thus， though this principle can extinguish Naien， ithelps to incur other 
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irnportant questions， so it is not adequate. 
b) The Principle of Marriage accornpanied with the cerernony. This is to adrnit 
the forrnation of rnarriage by perforrning the cerernony in accordance with the custorn 
in the country. This principle is in accordance with our custom or consciousness， 
and the supporters are not a few， and such conclusion of the Cornrnittee of the Govern-
rnent was published. But the defect about this is as to the parties who fail to perforrn 
the rnarriage cerernony. In this respect， sorne theories insisted to adrnit， incase of 
non-cerernony， the rnarriage to corne into existence by the registrationof the parties. 
But Naien rnay arise without any doubt when the parties fail to register. 
The defect of this theory， however， rnay be fewer than that of the Principle of 
Registered-marriage， for persons who don't hold their cerernony or who fail to register 
rnay be few. Therefore the nurnber of Naien-relation rnay decrease than that at the 
present tirne. But being unable to dirninish absolutely the present defects， this prin:-
ciple is not always adequate. 
c) The Principle of Civil-rnarriage like in rnodern Europe. According to this 
principle， when such steps as the publication of banns， the notice of celebration， the 
ceremony before the oficial registrar or in the registry， are taken， the rnarriage cornes 
valid. However， we can easily irnagine of the persons who fail to observe such pro-
cedure. Therefore this cannot be of any help to solve Naien problerns. 
d) At last we rnust corne back to the Principle of Registered幽rnarriage. Of 
course this has a defect to allow N aien咽relationto arise. But we cannot deny that 
this principle is suitable to maintain rnonogarny， toprevent the forrnation of unlawful 
rnarriage and to ascertain the parties and the date of the forrnation of rnarriage. Ac-
cordingly， the author believes it the best o rnake effort to decrease the nurnber of Naien 
following this principle. Next， let us consider the problerns which exist in the Prin-
ciple of Registered-rnarriage. 
As rnentioned above， the irnpedirnents to a valid rnarriage which existed before 
the War disappeared. But it is apprehended that the idea of feudal farnily stil rernains 
in the consciousness of the pople. But on the other side， itseems that the transition 
to the new era has steadily been on the way. The idea of rnarriage on the equal and 
free standpoints and on their own responsibility， has gradual1y spreaded， especially 
arnong young邑rgenerations. T 
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present， marriage ceremonies according to custom are various， for instance， they are 
held at shrines， temples， private buildings for celebration， oficial buildings and private 
houses， etc・ ltis impossible to specify the places nor to impose the duty of registra-
tion upon， for instance， priest of shrine or superintendent of rite. But it wil1 be one 
measure to impose him the duty to report to the public 0伍ce，which serves on parties 
the notice to push the registration. 80 far as the parties have the intention to register， 
the registration wi1 be performed ear1ier， and the gap of the time between the fact 
(actual date of marriage) and the legal recog出 ionwi1 become smaller. Again， there 
are some ceremonies in which the parties note down and sign in the register-paper， 
as a part of the procedure. lt may be reasonable to orient the general attitude to such 
a way. At the same time， itis important to make the people understood the difference 
between the lawful marriage and Naien - difference of legal protection - and to let 
them recognize the importance of the registration. According to the investigation (to 
inquire which the people think most important among the celebration， cohabitation 
and registration)， itrevealed that the registration is not always recognized of its impor-
tance. Though， of course， registration is not ignored， but is belittled in respect of 
the fact it is the sole requirement for the legal formation of marriage. It is necessary 
and also possible to promote the registration by the active persuation of the state. By 
the way， in this respect， there is a remarkable fact to .show. As the statistic above 
showed (p. 14)， the registration are performed ear1ier recently than in the previous time. 
For "instance， comparing the figures in 1952-60 with that of 1940-49， the ratio of the 
marriage in 1952-60 which was registered within six months after the celebration or 
cohabitation was 59.3， while in 1940-4942.5. It vividly shows that the modern thought 
of marriage has been widely spreading among the people and the consciousness about 
the registration is keenly awakened. 
勢
Naien is an old and yet a new problem for us Japanese jurist. Numerous efforts 
have been instiled into the solution of the questions. And they have been solved 
steadily and in turn. Naien is the product of the Principle of Registered-marriage. 
This troublesome phenomena arised from the adoption of the principle which was 
not in accordance with the custom or consciousness of the people. But no absolute 
or better principle to substitute it regarding the formation of the marriage can be found. 
Again， itmust be noted that most marriage ceremonies in our country， being different 
from that in other countries， are not related to the (religious) faith in which the parties 
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believe. Further， our marriage law and consciousness in the post-war time tel us that 
the origination of Naien can be prevented by means of diminishing the defects arising 
from the Principle of Registered司marriagefol1owing this principle. The orientation 
to this should be made strongly. 
Thedifferences between Naien and the lawful marriage are in some points; the 
right of the succession， the legitimacy of the issues， the common use of the surname， 
the origination of the a伍nity. The extinguishment of those， however， means the 
defeat of the Principle of Registered鋤marriageand the change to the Principle of De 
fa山田r巾 gefrom it. The difference between N aien and the lawful marriage has 
gradual1y dwindled， that is， the protection to the parties to Naien has been strengthen-
ed. It seems to the author that the protection to Naien couples is close to its maximum 
1imit. The solution of Naien problems is now on the五nalstep， and to be done thereafter 
is， asthe author believe， the reexamination and amendment of the Principle of Regis-
tered -marriage. 
1) It should be noted that， asshown in this treatise， Naien is different from a 
intimate-relation of man and woman， or a concubine-relation. 
2) We have many remarkable works wrItten in J apanese regarding N aien. Though 
the author owes much to them in preparing this treatise， he will refrain from men-
tioning particular titles and names in every place. Again， we have the work written 
in Eng1ish ‘The validaty of Naien' by Prof; Civisca， which treats principally the 
validity of Naien from the viewpoint of the ecclesiastical law. 
3) a -This table was made by the author， arranging some reports published 
by scholars. And， those which are not necessary for the further description in this 
treatise， were omitted. 
b -Places in which the investigation was made and numbers of case are 
various， therefore the intention of the author is to show the g巴neralinclination about 
the registration. 
c -Investigations A and B in 1949， were made by different persons and in 
different cities. 
d -Monthly divisions are based on 'Ful1 month'， except figures (約 of‘52， 
‘55，‘58 which are based on the calculation of calender months (e.g.，明Tithinone 
month' means ‘the ~ame calender month'). 
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4) As Japanese law of succession is different from the one of the Anglo-Ameri-
can Law in many respects， itis di伍cultto find the suitable word to its content. 
'Inheritance' means aI the property which belonged to the dead. Again，‘heir-at明
law' below means the person who is entit1ed to suceed such property. 
5) Of course， insuccession the negative effort (preventing decrease of the pro-
perty) can be imaginable， but it is clear that aI the cases are not always as such， 
since there may be a case which may lasts for a extremely short time. 
6) Though this word is used in this treatise for the convenience， itmeans cor同
rectIy persons who have lived together with the dead lessee as a family. 
7) Though some assert an analogical-application of the Lease of House Act 
s. 1-2，也eopposite opinion exists. 
